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1. Introduction
1 
A central issue in discussions about the world’s financial system is the nature of the 
relationship between international financial institutions (IFIs) and private international 
capital markets. On the one hand they may be viewed as substitutes, with IFIs 
becoming involved in countries that have little access to private capital or where 
private capital outflows have created a short-term external financing vacuum. Those 
who subscribe to the idea of creditor moral hazard go further and claim that the 
prospect of future IFI lending in the event of a crisis encourages private lenders to 
underestimate risk and to lend excessively. The over-lending then causes the crisis 
which in turn results in private capital outflows and the anticipated bail-out lending by 
the IFIs. Viewed as complements, on the other hand, IFI lending is claimed to have a 
catalytic effect on private capital market lending. In this case the IFIs are presented as 
bailing in private capital through signalling, coordination, or coercion. Through 
catalysis the IFIs can facilitate balance of payments adjustment with fewer of its own 
resources. The nature and size of the catalytic effect is therefore of considerable 
importance. If it is misinterpreted and overestimated the consequence is likely to be 
deficient amounts of external financing and sub-optimal balance of payments 
adjustment.  
Although rather overlooked in the past, increasing attention is now being paid 
in particular to the catalytic effect of IMF programs on private capital flows. This is 
perhaps unsurprising given the incidence of financial crises, the widely perceived 
problem of capital instability and reduced capital flows, and the reluctance of the 
IMF’s shareholders to increase its resources. The increasing attention has been 
reflected by a flurry of papers on different dimensions of the catalytic effect. The 
                                                 
1 We would like to thank, without implicating them in any errors, the British Academy for financial 
support, Mejlina Modanu and Jano Bourgeois for research assistance, and Rose Anne Devlin for 
comments.    3
literature has become large enough to warrant a survey article (Cottarelli and 
Giannini, 2002) that plots out the evolution of the concept, analyses the mechanisms 
through which it may operate, and evaluates the available empirical evidence relating 
to its existence. Until recently, however, the analysis of the competing modalities via 
which catalysis may occur has been largely informal, and the lack of a formal 
theoretical framework has impeded the formulation of specific empirical questions. 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the next stage of research into the 
catalytic effect. Do recent formal theoretical analyses enable us to delineate a finer 
and more nuanced empirical investigation? Do more subtle results emerge from this 
investigation, and, if so, do these carry with them new policy insights? 
  The paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 briefly revisits the 
conventional analysis of catalysis but goes on to examine recent theoretical 
contributions. The discussion in this section endeavors to formulate a series of 
hypotheses or propositions that can then be tested against the data. Section 3 provides 
a succinct and representative (rather than comprehensive) summary of the existing 
empirical research into the catalytic effect. Section 4 explains the method and data 
used in some new empirical estimations aimed fairly specifically at testing the 
propositions that emerge from the recent theoretical work on catalytic finance. Section 
5 presents and discusses the results discovered. Finally, section 6 explores the policy 
implications of the findings reported in the previous section and offers some 
concluding remarks that place the concept of catalytic finance into the wider context 
of capital mobilization and the reform of the IMF. 
 
2. Catalysis: Theoretical Underpinnings 
In their review of the catalytic effect, Cottarelli and Giannini (2002) claim that there 
are five channels through which it may work: policy design, information,   4
commitment, screening, and insurance. IMF programs may lead to the design of 
superior economic policies that improve economic performance above and beyond 
what would have been achieved in their absence. They may carry within them 
information that would otherwise be unavailable to private capital markets concerning 
future economic policy and performance relating to key economic variables. Programs 
may signal a government’s commitment to reform, and reduce the chances that there 
will be policy slippages or reversals. They may screen out governments that are not 
serious about reform. Finally, and as Cottarelli and Giannini present it, the IMF might 
play an insurance role by acting as a lender of last resort, thereby inducing private 
capital markets to lend. As noted earlier, however, this effect is more conventionally 
viewed as creditor moral hazard rather than as catalysis. 
In earlier research Rodrik (1996) and Bird and Rowlands (1997) focused on 
conditionality as the principal modality via which catalysis occurs. The strength of the 
catalytic effect then depends on the perceived appropriateness of the design of 
conditionality, and the chances that it will be implemented. In short, catalysis will 
tend to work better where conditionality carries credibility. If, however, private 
markets believe that IMF programs will lead to recession and corporate and financial 
failure, or that the policies embedded in conditionality will not be implemented, then 
catalysis will be weak or non-existent. It may even be perverse if IMF programs 
transmit negative signals. 
More recently, and in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis in 1997/98 and 
subsequent crises, the focus has tended to shift to the role of the IMF in helping to 
overcome liquidity crises by contributing to short run financing needs. Collective 
action problems may make capital markets reluctant to lend to a country because of 
the perceived probability of default. If IMF lending induces a stronger commitment to 
adjustment, by making the associated policies more sustainable politically, markets   5
may perceive that default is less likely and may then be more willing to lend. Of 
course in the absence of conditionality, there is a risk that the additional finance 
provided by the IMF may allow governments to relax their adjustment efforts and thus 
increase the default risk. In this context a number of papers have investigated the logic 
of partial as opposed to complete bailouts, frequently arguing that partial bailouts 
leave open multiple equilibria that in turn induce private creditors to foreclose and 
bring about default and a crisis. Creditors are not co-ordinated and only a full bailout 
that completely fills the financing gap will restore confidence (Zettelmeyer, 2000, 
Frankel and Roubini, 2001, Jeanne and Wyplosz, 2001). 
Recent contributions to the theory of the catalytic effect have concentrated on 
the impact of IMF lending on the probability of default. Morris and Shin (2003) use a 
global games framework to analyse the behavior of three players; short- term 
creditors, the IMF and debtor governments. In this co-ordination game with limited 
uncertainty, IMF lending may be necessary and just sufficient to supplement the 
financial resources a debtor country obtains from adjustment efforts (ie to raise the 
returns to adjustment) thereby encouraging short-term creditors to roll over their debt 
despite initial concerns about liquidity (as opposed to solvency). When a country has 
relatively strong fundamentals and where the government’s commitment to stabilize 
the economy is clear, there is little risk of illiquidity, little need for additional 
resources, and little or no role for IMF-induced catalysis. Where economic problems 
are fundamental and deep-seated, or where independent adjustment effort would tend 
to be low, the relatively small increase in resources associated with IMF programs is 
unlikely to persuade governments to increase their adjustment efforts substantially, 
and will fail to persuade creditors to roll over debts. Catalysis is therefore unlikely to 
exist here either, and the Fund’s resources may well be wasted. Where catalysis may 
occur is for countries on the margin of default. Here an IMF program may provide   6
just enough resources and incentive to adjust to instil confidence in the markets and 
induce them to roll over debts.  
Similar conclusions emerge from Corsetti, Guimaraes and Roubini (2003), 
who build a model in which crises are caused by the interaction between poor 
fundamentals, self-fulfilling creditor runs, and the policies of investors, governments 
and the IMF. In the context of this model the IMF can prevent a scramble for liquidity 
by co-ordinating agents’ expectations and by increasing the number of creditors 
willing to lend for any given set of fundamentals. The Fund’s influence will increase 
with the size of its lending and the precision of its information. As with the Morris 
and Shin model, IMF lending may strengthen a government’s incentive to pursue 
policies of economic adjustment. Even IMF lending that only partially fills an external 
financing gap may help to avoid default. 
In a related model, Penalver (2003) suggests that it is the implicit subsidy on 
IMF resources that encourages borrowing countries to exert adjustment effort and to 
avoid default. By preventing default, IMF lending increases the marginal rate of 
return to investment and this encourages capital flows. Penalver’s analysis therefore 
builds an analytical bridge between debt rollovers and new capital flows. 
A reasonably simple and well-established point lies behind this ‘new wave’ of 
catalytic finance model. The catalytic effect relies, to a significant degree, upon the 
extent to which IMF involvement reduces uncertainty and increases the incentive for 
indebted countries to pursue desirable (but costly) adjustment policies, either because 
of lending (as the models themselves accentuate), or due to conditionality. For 
countries with fundamental economic problems, IMF involvement may be insufficient 
to alter the perceptions of private capital markets and indeed may trigger an outflow 
of private capital by facilitating its substitution with official resources. For economies 
that appear to be fundamentally fairly sound, IMF involvement will have either no   7
impact or may transmit a negative signal to private capital markets. For a range of 
countries between these extremes, however, IMF involvement may help to reduce 
uncertainty and provide assurances that the added liquidity and adjustment effort will 
be sufficient to move the economy forward. It is in these situations that, a priori, 
catalysis may be expected to be relatively strong. 
A common dimension of these models is their emphasis on expected returns to 
lenders that face uncertainty. By directing our attention to the two elements of risk 
and return, more insights can be acquired. Return will be related to things such as 
economic growth and total factor productivity in the borrowing country, while risk 
may take the form of either default or exchange rate risk. IMF programs will, in 
principle, have a catalytic effect either by raising returns or reducing risks. Of course 
different types of capital inflow will have different risk and return profiles, so that the 
IMF may affect both the volume and composition of flows. For example, the 
provision of liquidity may provide security to creditors expecting repayment in the 
short or medium term, while any recession associated adjustment may discourage 
investors in equity. Similarly, IMF enforced fiscal stringency may encourage flows 
that are guaranteed by the recipient government, while leaving non-guaranteed 
creditors unaffected. Eichengreen, Mody and Kletzer (2006) also point out that bank 
lending and bonds may be affected differently by IMF involvement.  
Ultimately these theoretical models remain conjectural in so far as they 
attempt to identify potential foundations for a catalytic effect. By building in different 
assumptions about uncertainty and signalling, or resource availability and creditor 
exit, it would be equally possible to build models of negative catalysis. Consequently, 
questions about catalysis need to be resolved empirically. At the same time, however, 
these newer models of catalytic finance have begun to refine our understanding of 
how the IMF may interact with member countries and other creditors. Thus these   8
theoretical frameworks make it possible to formulate a number of propositions 
relating to the catalytic effect that can guide empirical investigation. Our reading of 
the literature suggests the following propositions for testing.  
First, IMF programs are more likely to be successful and to be associated with 
restoring or establishing satisfactory economic progress if initial conditions are not 
severely adverse. The catalytic effect will therefore tend to be weak in situations 
where the economic fundamentals are very poor, but less weak when they are 
stronger. However, for countries with strong fundamentals IMF arrangements may 
again exert little catalytic effect and may even exert an adverse one by transmitting a 
negative signal. 
Second, IMF conditionality will be effective at catalyzing private capital flows 
only if financial markets judge Fund programs to be both well designed and likely to 
be implemented. Until we have a clearer understanding of the determinants of 
implementation, so that it may be predicted ex ante, it is reasonable to assume that 
creditors may be inclined to wait and see whether governments keep to the policy 
commitments they have made, or to take into account a country’s track record of 
implementation. There are different ways of trying to examine this effect. Here, we 
examine the effect of past program completion in order to facilitate our focus on the 
catalytic effect of program signing.
2 A history of incomplete IMF programs should 
discourage catalysis.  
Third, leading on from the above, there is a reasonable presumption that the 
prolonged use of IMF resources implies either the existence of intractable economic 
or political problems or a serial reluctance to implement programs. It follows that the 
                                                 
2 An alternative would be to examine end of program effects and link these to program success. In 
other words, any catalytic effect will be delayed and program announcements alone would not, on 
these grounds, be expected to have any catalytic effect. 
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catalytic effect will be stronger for temporary rather than prolonged users of IMF 
resources.  
Fourth, the type of facility under which resources are borrowed from the Fund 
gives a further indication of the nature of the economic problems being encountered. 
Stand-bys tend to be associated with short-term stabilisation while EFFs are 
associated with structural adjustment. Given the earlier analysis, it follows that stand-
by arrangements may be expected to exhibit a stronger catalytic effect than EFFs. 
Fifth, where countries encounter problems of illiquidity, it may be expected 
that catalysis will be stronger when IMF lending is large relative to a country’s 
financing needs. With IMF credits being conditional, the incentive to implement 
programs may also be expected to be higher in these cases, and this would have a 
further indirect positive impact on the degree of catalysis. However, it may be a 
country’s precautionary borrowing potential that is important; the actual use of these 
resources may negatively affect catalysis.  
Sixth, the decision of existing creditors as to whether or not to roll over 
existing debt may be determined by a softer set of criteria than the decision of 
potential creditors with respect to new loans. Existing creditors may be persuaded to 
undertake defensive lending whereas new creditors have nothing to defend. Existing 
creditors may therefore be principally concerned to avoid debtor default, while new 
creditors will be looking for an acceptable risk-adjusted rate of return. Consequently, 
the catalytic effect may be stronger on the rolling over of existing debt than on new 
lending and in practice should be stronger on short-term debt.  
A seventh and final proposition is that the catalytic effect will vary across 
different types of private capital flow, since they are affected by different factors. For 
example, short-term creditors may be concerned about macroeconomic stability while 
long-term investors may look beyond this for evidence of structural adjustment.   10
  While these propositions find resonance in recent theoretical papers, some 
have been identified in the past on the basis of less formal theorizing and observation. 
What support for them exists in previous empirical research?  
 
3. Existing Evidence on Catalysis 
The existing empirical evidence on the catalytic effect has been summarised at some 
length elsewhere (Bird and Rowlands 2002, Cottarelli and Giannini, 2002, and 
Hovaguimian, 2003). The methodologies used have included large sample 
econometric estimation, case studies and attitude surveys of market operators. The 
general consensus from this body of research is that there is relatively little evidence 
in support of the catalytic effect of IMF lending on private capital flows, at least not 
as a universal, strong and positive phenomenon. Individual studies do, however, 
discover evidence of a significant positive effect on some flows in specific 
circumstances.  Can theory tell us why different results have been discovered, and 
how disparate results can be reconciled? 
The theoretical review in the previous section of this paper more 
systematically identifies the circumstances in which a catalytic effect may be expected 
to be at its weakest and at its strongest. Some of the existing empirical research is 
relevant in this context. In a study of the bond market, Mody and Saravia (2002) find 
evidence that countries with weak fundamentals do not experience catalysis while 
those where the fundamentals are less weak encounter a significant positive catalytic 
effect. Bordo, Mody and Oomes (2004: 18) report similar results, but find a ‘dip and 
recovery’ pattern, concluding “that IMF programs are most successful at keeping 
capital flowing to countries with bad, but not very bad fundamentals.” Jensen (2004) 
and Edwards (forthcoming) find less favorable results for foreign direct investment 
and portfolio flows respectively. Bird and Rowlands (2002) also find that   11
disaggregation across time periods, samples, individual lending facilities, and the 
degree of conditionality, previous experience with the IMF and types of capital flow, 
make a difference. They recount a complex story for the effect of IMF programs on 
private flows. However, while these studies have shed important light on the catalytic 
effect, they do not set out to test specific propositions such as those formulated in the 
previous section. The remainder of this paper sets out to fill this gap.  
 
4. Estimations, Methods and Data 
The most appropriate estimation approach to examine catalysis is open to some 
debate. Some of the previously published empirical work has avoided using formal 
selection correction procedures in the estimated equations (Bird and Rowlands 1997, 
2002; Rowlands 2000).  Instead, less formal approaches were used to try and deal 
with the problem of selection, as in Bird and Rowlands (2002).  In more recent work, 
Mody and Saravia (2003) undertake some formal selection correction estimations 
when examining the catalytic effect of IMF programs in the bond market, as do 
Jensen (2004) and Edwards (forthcoming). 
The selection problem may, in principle, be serious. It is well known that 
when linking economic outcomes to the presence of IMF programs it is problematic to 
attribute a correlation to the program itself, let alone to assert causality. Countries are 
generally anticipated to go to the IMF for a program when their balance of payments 
is unsustainable. There is, therefore, presumably a non-random distribution of 
countries between those with and those without programs. More specifically, the 
fragile economic conditions countries are expected to be experiencing when they go 
to the Fund may be linked to subsequent weak performance. The a priori expectation 
is, therefore, that the magnitude of estimated catalytic effects will be biased 
downwards if not corrected for non-random selectivity bias.    12
However, the correction procedure and the extent of any bias is itself open to 
debate.  While there is a growing consensus about what factors contribute to a 
country’s propensity to turn to the IMF, equations attempting to identify these factors 
formally have proven disappointing.  Many variables turn out to be statistically 
significant in explaining the presence or absence of a Fund agreement, but they do not 
seem particularly robust across different samples, nor do they improve the within-
sample prediction success level much beyond a straight guess of “no agreement” (see 
Bird and Rowlands 2001, 2003, 2005).  Given the possibility of multiple economic 
and political reasons for turning to the IMF, and the difficulty of structuring these 
properly in an estimation procedure, the distribution of IMF agreements may well 
appear “random” when estimated using current methods. Further, there is mixed 
evidence about the necessity of selection correction procedures. While Vreeland 
(2003) finds that the selection problem does introduce bias when studying the effects 
of the IMF on growth and inequality, the results reported by Edwards (forthcoming) 
when examining catalysis appear much less sensitive to it.   
There is also the question of how to model empirically the selection bias. 
There are multiple approaches. For example, Vreeland (2003) uses a Heckman 
correction procedure, while Barro and Lee (2005) use instrumental variables. In this 
paper we use a treatment effects model as the primary estimation procedure (Brock 
and Durlauf, 2001, Greene, 2003). Effectively this is an instrumental variables 
estimation that restricts the program presence estimation to a specific functional 
form.
3 Thus, the estimating model explicitly corrects for selection using the following 
structure (following Greene, 2003): 
Capital inflowsi,t = X’i,t β + δCi,t + ε it, 
 
                                                 
3 The less restricted instrumental variable approach was also used as a robustness check, and is reported 
on below.    13
where the non-treatment variables believed to affect capital flows are in X’i,t , Ci,t is a 
binary indicator of whether country i has started an IMF program
4 – the treatment – in 
period t.  The vector of parameters for the non-treatment variables is β, while δ 
captures the effect of the IMF treatment on capital flows.  A government’s choice of 
undergoing IMF treatment, however, is related to an endogenous, but unobservable, 
latent variable C
*
i,t that can be modelled as: 
C
*
i,t = Wi,t γ + µi,t , and Ci,t = 1 if  C
*
i,t > 0, and Ci,t = 0 if  C
*
i,t # 0. 
The independent variables explaining why the government signs an agreement with 
the Fund are in Wi,t and their effects are captured by the parameter vector γ. The two 
error terms, ε it  and µi,t , are assumed to have a bivariate normal distribution with zero 
mean, ε it  has variance σ and µi,t  has variance 1, and ε it and µi,t have covariance ρ. We 
can consequently estimate the effect on various capital flows of the IMF program as a 
treatment, while correcting for the endogenous choice of entering such an agreement.  
For the primary estimations we use a maximum likelihood procedure that provides for 
robust variance-covariance estimation by permitting observations on each country to 
be treated as potentially dependent.  The estimations were conducted using Stata. 
The data used for the estimation are an unbalanced panel of 868 observations
5 
on 67 middle-income countries (as classified currently by the World Bank).  Although 
data are collected from 1970, missing data and lag structures restrict the sample to the 
period 1979-2000.  All variable definitions and sources are provided in the appendix.   
The dependent variable measuring the catalytic effect is the ratio of a 
country’s net private capital flow to its gross domestic product (GDP).  Net flows are 
examined both in total and broken down into their various sub-categories: portfolio 
                                                 
4 There are also, of course, numerous ways of capturing the effects of IMF programs. Here we use the 
signing of an agreement, rather than its ongoing presence, as the basis for both identifying the 
signalling effect of program initiation, as well as the basis for selection correction.  
5 Many observations in the original data set were lost because of missing data and the removal of 
countries from the sample that could not technically sign an IMF agreement because they were already 
operating under one.    14
flows, foreign direct investment, short-term debt, public and publicly guaranteed debt 
flows in aggregate as well as disaggregated into their components (bonds, bank debt, 
and other) and non-guaranteed debt flows in aggregate as well as sub-divided into 
bond and bank components.  
The independent variables included in our capital flows equation reflect basic 
economic conditions. These are: per capita GNP, lagged growth rates, lagged 
investment rates, the export to GDP ratio, real international interest rates, the inflation 
rate, the lagged rate of change in the real exchange rate, a lagged measure of reserve 
adequacy, the debt-service ratio, the ratio of publicly guaranteed debt to GDP, an 
indicator of past arrears, and an indicator of past debt rescheduling requirements. 
Since the current theoretical foundations for explaining international capital flows are 
inadequate as a basis for identifying a compelling estimating equation, we selected 
these variables because they have been commonly included in the empirical literature. 
The expectations about how these variables should affect inflows of capital are 
relatively clear. Those variables that suggest robust economic conditions should 
attract capital, while indicators of difficulty or weak fundamentals will presumably 
deter inflows.  
Finally, we wish to examine how IMF activity affects capital flows. Three 
IMF-related variables are added to the list of explanatory variables for the capital flow 
estimations. First, we examine the number of months in which a country was 
previously under an agreement (weighted more heavily for more recent years). This 
measure gives a sense of whether past program experience assists in attracting 
additional capital flows. Second, we examine the amount of resources drawn from the 
IMF as a share of imports and debt service payments in an attempt to separate out the 
effects of program conditionality from any associated liquidity effects, and to examine 
the degree of substitution that may occur between IMF funds and other sources of   15
capital. Third, we examine the record of program completion to determine whether a 
history of poor implementation affects capital flows. 
Finally, we include the IMF treatment variable as indicated by the signing of a 
non-concessionary program with the Fund, either a standby agreement (SBA), or an 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program. The selection equation to correct for bias uses 
standard explanatory variables from the literature. However, some economic and all 
of the political variables were removed in a stepwise fashion because they were 
statistically insignificant in initial probit equations, and using fewer variables 
improved the chances of convergence in the estimations.  Consequently our selection 
equation includes per capita GNI, long-term economic growth, short-term growth, 
reserve adequacy, changes in reserves, inflation, the current account balance, changes 
in the current account, real depreciation, the debt-service ratio, debt levels, an 
indicator of impending rescheduling needs, an indicator of past IMF presence, and an 
indicator for the presence of fixed exchange rate regimes. All of these selection 
variables were lagged to reduce simultaneity. 
In addition to the primary estimations on the full sample, we also examined 
the effects of SBA and EFF programs separately. In addition, we used a probit 
equation to generate propensities for countries to have an IMF program in different 
years. These propensities were then used to group observations so that the treatment 
effects model could also be estimated using sub-samples of countries with similar 
estimated probabilities of an IMF program.   
 
5. Results. 
The results of the treatment effects estimations and the selection equation results for 
the full sample estimates for total capital flows are presented in Table 1a. Tables 1b 
and 1c present the results for the full sample estimations on the different categories of   16
capital flows, though the selection equations are suppressed for brevity. Finally, Table 
2 shows the IMF program effects for different IMF non-concessional programs for 
different sub-samples of countries with similar propensities to have an IMF 
agreement, the latter being calculated from a probit equation the results of which are 
presented in Table 3.   
  Before examining the evidence on the seven propositions discussed above, 
some general observations can be made about the equations. First of all, the 
estimating equations perform reasonably well. With the exception of the public and 
publicly guaranteed bond flow equation, all have an acceptable level of joint 
coefficient significance. In some estimating equations there are some statistically 
significant coefficient estimates that conform to our a priori expectations. For 
example, from Table 1a we can see that higher investment rates and export-to-GDP 
ratios encourage capital inflows while high inflation discourages them. However, 
there are also some interesting anomalies, with past high economic growth 
discouraging, and past arrears encouraging, additional capital inflows.  
In terms of IMF-related effects, past IMF program experience is positively 
associated with new inflows and for each dollar of IMF funds used there is a reduction 
in net private inflows.
6 Critically, signing an IMF agreement itself seems to have a 
very large negative effect on capital inflows, amounting to 16.8 percent of GDP. This 
effect will, of course, generally be diluted by the fact that many IMF program 
countries will have had recent past agreements as well. Thus, for example, a country 
that signs a new IMF agreement after two years of an old agreement experiences a 
decline in capital inflows of approximately nine percent of GDP. 
                                                 
6 Since the total debt service and imports are on average approximately 50 percent of GDP, the implied 
rate of substitution between IMF inflows (as a percentage of imports and debt service payments) and 
private capital flows is approximately twice the coefficient estimate in the Tables. Thus, for all flows, 
the rate of substitution is approximately 1.4 dollars of private inflows lost for every dollar of IMF 
inflows.     17
For the most part, the equations correcting for selection performed consistently 
well and selection bias proved unimportant only in the cases of PNG debt, PNG Bank, 
PPG bond and PPG Other (see Tables 1b,c). Key explanatory variables typically 
found to be associated with a higher likelihood of an IMF agreement were low 
economic growth, high inflation, high current account deficits, high rates of real 
currency depreciation, imminent rescheduling, and past IMF programs.  
Finally, several versions of the estimations were examined in order to check 
the sensitivity of the results. There was no evidence of multicollinearity. Different 
versions of the treatment effects model, for example including the lagged dependent 
variable for past capital flows, or using a different estimating algorithm, yielded 
similar results to those reported here. However, when the model was estimated 
without selection correction using either ordinary least squares or panel data 
procedures, the IMF variables had no statistically significant coefficient estimates for 
the aggregate capital flow equations. Similarly, when selectivity was corrected using 
the instrumental variables technique with the same instrument variables as we used in 
the selection equation, again the IMF effect was insignificant. Therefore not only does 
selection bias seem important in general, but also the actual method of correction 
seems to matter. In addition, some of the sub-sample estimations were sensitive to 
changes in the boundaries defining the group, suggesting that some care is needed in 
identifying groups for which the catalytic effect is similar. The sensitivity of the 
results to the method of selection correction highlights the importance of making 
progress in terms of understanding the determinants of IMF program signing as well 
as the equations that explain specific capital flows.   
   18
Evidence on the propositions 
Proposition one suggested that the catalytic effect should be relatively strong for 
countries in difficulty but not distress, and relatively weak for countries with either 
better or worse fundamentals. Evidence on this proposition is provided by a 
comparison of the last four columns of Table 2.  For example, the overall negative 
effect of IMF programs on all net capital flows is found primarily in countries with 
stronger fundamentals. In fact, and consistent with proposition one, IMF programs 
have a positive effect on countries whose fundamentals are in the middle of the range 
for the sample. There appears to be no significant effect of IMF agreements for 
countries with the highest probability of signing an IMF agreement and, therefore, 
arguably in most distress.  
Variable effects across different ranges of the sample are also observed for 
different components of capital flows. Portfolio flows reacted much more positively 
to IMF agreements when conditions were in the middle range, as did FDI. Short-term 
debt flows, which dominated the overall capital inflow results, exhibited the same 
pattern as the aggregate flow equations.  This pattern also existed for both total PNG 
debt and total PPG debt. Within the components of PNG debt, bonds were again most 
significantly associated with IMF programs when the propensity to sign a program 
fell in the middle range of probability; when the probability was high there was no 
significant effect. PNG bank flows, in contrast, responded positively to IMF 
agreements when conditions were bad, negatively to them when conditions were 
strong, and insignificantly when conditions were in the middle. Finally, in terms of 
PPG debt, IMF agreements provoked increased bond inflows only when conditions 
were either very good or very bad, while bank flows generally reacted negatively 
except under very distressed conditions.     19
Thus proposition one receives broad support in aggregate terms as well as for 
a number of important subgroups. There are some exceptions, however, reinforcing 
the message that it is extremely difficult to make generalizations about catalysis in 
terms of how specific capital flows will respond, and under what circumstances.  
Proposition two suggests that poor program implementation will weaken the 
catalytic effect. It is difficult to test all of the interpretations of this proposition, so 
here we focus on the general effect that weak implementation has on catalysis by 
examining the estimated coefficient for the indicator of previous incomplete 
programs. Overall there is weak evidence that the effect of past IMF program 
incompletion on capital flows is negative. Though not reported here for reasons of 
space
7 the presence of past program incompletion seems particularly significant in 
deterring capital flows when conditions are neither bad nor good; this applies in 
particular to short-term debt, FDI, and PPG debt flows. Therefore past program failure 
does seem to have a generally negative effect on capital flows, but not a very 
consistent or powerful one.  
Proposition three suggests that a lengthy history of IMF programs, even when 
completed, will reduce the catalytic effect by signalling structural difficulties. 
Recidivism is generally associated with poorer countries (Bird, Hussain and Joyce, 
2004), so here, and given our focus on middle-income countries, we examine this 
proposition by looking at a shorter three-year history.  The estimations for aggregate 
net flows do not support the proposition; past IMF programs have a statistically 
significant positive effect on capital flows, raising them by 0.3 percent of GDP for 
every recent month of an agreement. While this effect appears fairly constant 
regardless of the propensity to sign an IMF agreement, it appears only sporadically for 
separate categories of capital flows (FDI, short-term debt, and PNG bank flows). 
                                                 
7 The full set of estimation results are available from the authors.   20
Proposition four suggests that catalysis may vary with the type of IMF 
agreement. Short term investors may be looking for the stability given by SBAs while 
longer term investors are looking beyond this for structural adjustment as reflected in 
EFFs. In general, SBAs dominate the main results due to their much greater frequency 
in the sample. For the most part SBA and EFF programs generated fairly similar 
results, although negative effects were more common in the case of EFFs.    
There were some interesting differences in the context of proposition four. On 
the one hand, potentially short-horizon capital such as portfolio flows, short-term 
debt, and other PPG debt (such as supplier credits) generally responded more 
favourably to SBAs than to EFFs. On the other hand, longer-term commitments such 
as FDI responded somewhat less negatively to EFFs than to SBAs.  In other cases the 
effects are more nuanced, as with PNG bond flows that responded favourably to 
SBAs when economic conditions were generally bad and negatively when they were 
stronger.  EFFs had positive effects when conditions were generally relatively good 
and negative effects for countries where conditions were bad but not disastrous.  So it 
may be the case that EFFs have effects that are less negative on longer-term flows, 
while SBAs support short-term flows better. 
Proposition five suggests that the liquidity effects of IMF programs may 
induce capital flows, particularly short term capital, although there may be a 
difference between used and unused access to IMF resources. When the liquidity 
measure is taken as actual drawings in a year
8, the results indicate a substitution effect 
between IMF credit and almost all other capital flows. Overall, the substitution effect 
is that for every one percent equivalent of imports and debt service provided by the 
IMF, other flows decline by around 0.7 percent of GDP, or a direct substitution effect 
                                                 
8 Estimations using the size of the original agreement as a percentage of GDP, indicating potential 
borrowing, had the same qualitative effect. This result is not really surprising, as most of the countries 
do draw on their agreements very quickly, and these drawings will typically be a fixed proportion of 
the actual agreement size.    21
of approximately 1.4 dollars lost of private net flows for every dollar of IMF inflows 
(see footnote 6). So the direct substitution effect is greater than one. The effect is 
particularly pronounced for FDI flows, for short-term flows, especially when 
conditions are reasonably good, and for PNG debt when conditions are bad, but not 
disastrous. This may imply that the IMF needs to lend more than a country’s 
anticipated capital shortfall in order to provide it with the desired balance between 
adjustment and financing. This result could be seen as being consistent with the claim 
that private capital markets may in some cases want to see a Fund program in place 
irrespective of the amount of Fund credit involved, but they do not want to see 
countries having to use them. This conclusion is similar to that drawn by Mody and 
Saravia (2002).
9 
Proposition six suggests that IMF programs will have a particularly marked 
effect on debt rollovers because of defensive lending. Perhaps the best way of 
understanding the roll-over phenomenon, given available data, is to examine short-
term debt flows, especially if, as Morris and Shin (2003) and Penalver (2004) claim, 
there will be a spill-over from debt rollovers to short-term lending.  However, our 
estimations provide no evidence in support of the proposition. Instead, we find that 
short-term debt flows respond very negatively to IMF agreements, particularly in 
countries with relatively good economic fundamentals. In these cases the signing of 
an IMF agreement seems to be transmitting a negative signal; any effect on debt 
rollovers per se is not spilling over to short-term debt in general.  
Proposition seven suggests that different types of capital flow are motivated in 
different ways and that IMF arrangements may therefore exert different degrees of 
                                                 
9 Mody and Saravia argue that having the Fund’s resources available is seen as a positive signal by 
bondholders, but that actually drawing on the resources is indicative of financial problems that may 
discourage lending.  Of course there is interesting endogeneity here: if the positive response to an 
agreement induces only limited capital inflows, a government may need to draw on its agreement and 
thereby possibly discourage further lending.      22
catalysis across them. We find ample evidence to support this proposition as reported 
above and seen in Tables 1 and 2. Sweeping generalisations about catalysis based on 
partial research are unsafe. While some of our results are in line with those reported 
by Mody and Saravia (2003), who focused on bonds, other results are consistent with 
those reported by Jensen (2004) for FDI. The important point is that the 
generalizations made on the basis of examining individual types of capital flow 
appear to be misplaced; the effects are varied and nuanced. 
The key result of this paper is in fact a generalization of this last point. 
Catalysis affects different types of capital flow in different ways, varies across IMF 
program type, and depends on the circumstances in which a country signs an IMF 
program.  While we cannot always specify exactly when catalysis will work in a 
specific manner, the results identify some basic lessons that help make more precise 
our understanding of how and when IMF programs affect private capital flows. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks. 
For many years the IMF has claimed that an important part of its role is to catalyse 
others to lend either by relieving immediate liquidity crises or more importantly by 
allowing governments to signal their commitment to reform through conditionality. 
Early empirical evidence seemed to be inconsistent with this claim. However, this 
early research dealt with potential selection bias in an informal way, and was not 
strongly grounded in any formal theoretical foundations. More recent research has 
attempted to deal with selection problems in more formal ways but it has examined 
individual flows such as bonds, portfolio flows, and FDI in isolation.  The results of 
these studies point in different directions, however, and making generalizations on the 
basis of any one of them is dangerous. Theoretical research has formally suggested 
that the degree of catalysis should depend on specific conditions such as the economic   23
fundamentals of a country.  While corroborating evidence has emerged in the 
empirical work, the implications from theory have not been explored 
comprehensively. 
This paper attempts to provide a more complete analysis of catalysis that is 
guided by theoretical insights, informed by both the necessity of correcting for 
selection and the limitations of doing so, and expansive in its consideration of which 
flows IMF programs may affect, and under what circumstances. Based on a treatment 
effects methodology to deal with selection problems, it explores the empirical 
connection between IMF programs and private capital flows in middle-income 
countries. Unlike other recent studies, it disaggregates across private capital flows as 
well as across IMF facilities. Rather than simply presenting the evidence, we also 
relate it to a series of propositions that emerge from recent theoretical models of 
catalytic finance. 
The results confirm that it is unsafe to make generalizations about the catalytic 
effect on the basis of partial results. There are some circumstances comprising 
economic fundamentals in the borrowing country, particular IMF facilities, past use of 
IMF resources, the record of failure or success, and specific types of capital flow, in 
which catalysis seems to occur. But there are others in which it does not, or in which 
the effect is profoundly negative.  There is also some worrying sensitivity to the 
selection procedures; simple selection corrections may well fail to capture the 
intricacies of IMF program allocation and lead to incorrect inferences. In the absence 
of a compelling understanding of the circumstances under which Fund programs are 
adopted, any results that rely on selection correction must remain tentative.  
Given the importance attached by the IMF to catalysis, and given that a belief 
in its efficacy has consequences for IMF lending and resources, the policy 
implications of this finding are very significant. Basically, the findings have two   24
policy messages. First, policy needs to be much more subtle, recognising the 
circumstances in which IMF programs are likely or are unlikely to exert a catalytic 
effect, as well as the detailed and disaggregated nature of this effect. Following on 
from this observation is the need to examine the ways in which the catalytic effect 
may be enhanced in order to provide sufficient adjustment assistance with limited 
IMF resources. Second, the limitations of catalysis need to be more fully accounted 
for in the design of IMF programs and in thinking about alternative ways of 
mobilising external capital in support of economic adjustment, as discussed in Bird 
and Rowlands (2004).  Finally, our results illustrate just how complex catalysis is. 
Simplistic assumptions about it are theoretically and empirically unjustified, and 
policies based on them are unlikely to be effective.    25
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No. of obs. 
P(β) = 0 (χ
2 test) 
ρ  
P(ρ) = 0 (χ
2 test) 
868    




Robust normal test statistics appear in parentheses.  The symbols ***, **, * and † 
indicate statistical significance at the 2%, 5%, 10% and 20% levels for two-tailed 
tests. The parameter ρ is the covariance between the estimating and selection 
equation. If ρ = 0, then the selectivity correction is not statistically important.   26
Table 1b: Treatment Effects Estimation on Net Flow Categories (selection not shown) 
Variable Short-term    FDI  Portfolio PPG  Debt  PNG  Debt 
GNP per cap. 
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2 test) 
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Robust normal test statistics appear in parentheses.  The symbols ***, **, * and † 
indicate statistical significance at the 2%, 5%, 10% and 20% levels for two-tailed 
tests. The parameter ρ is the covariance between the estimating and selection 
equation. If ρ = 0, then the selectivity correction is not statistically important. 
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Table1c: Treatment Effects Estimation for Net Debt Flow Categories (selection not 
shown). 
Variable  PPG Bank  PPG Bond  PPG Other  PNG Bank  PNG Bond 
GNP per cap. 
 
Lagged Growth  
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Robust normal test statistics appear in parentheses.  The symbols ***, **, * and † 
indicate statistical significance at the 2%, 5%, 10% and 20% levels for two-tailed 
tests. The parameter ρ is the covariance between the estimating and selection 
equation. If ρ = 0, then the selectivity correction is not statistically important. Note 
that the PPG Bond estimates are in italics, signifying (close) rejection of the test of the 
equation’s significance.   28


















IMF  -16.8*** -18.7***  6.38**  0.940  -18.6*** 
SBA  -16.6*** -18.1***  7.68***  3.01  -18.1*** 
All 
flows/GDP 
EFF  -17.9***  nc  -6.82***  -0.740  -17.5*** 
IMF  1.13*** 0.667†  8.56*  2.12  1.09*** 
SBA  1.15*** 0.846**  0.736 ns  1.11*** 
Portfolio 
flows/GDP 
EFF  -0.300†  1.41 0.529  ns  -0.268 
IMF  -1.89** -3.77** 2.45*** -3.00***  -2.51*** 
SBA  -2.44*** -3.03**  2.77*** -2.78*** -2.85*** 
FDI/GDP 
EFF  -0.957  -0.213 -4.24 -0.441 -1.77 
IMF  -12.3***  ns ns  -0.480  -13.4*** 
SBA ns  ns  3.85***  -0.554  -13.1*** 
Short term 
debt/GDP 
EFF  -14.4***  nc ns  -3.53***  -14.1† 
IMF 2.07  -1.15**  0.695  1.07*** 1.48*** 
SBA 0.202  -1.28**  0.663  1.21*** 1.39*** 
PNG 
debt/GDP 
EFF -0.168  -0.564  -0.411  -0.334  1.92*** 
IMF  0.388*** 0.508***  0.417**  -0.0813  0.369*** 
SBA  -0.410*** -0.203*  0.455***  -0.0195  0.371*** 
PNG 
bonds/GDP 
EFF -0.0835  0.369* -0.265**  -0.00104  0.384*** 
IMF 0.142  -0.927**  0.667  0.943*** 1.35*** 
SBA 0.140  -0.913**  0.613  1.14*** 1.30*** 
PNG 
Bank/GDP 
EFF -0.0902  -0.298 -0.239 -0.470 1.76*** 
IMF  -0.553** -1.53†  0.787 0.610 -0.400 
SBA  -0.540* -2.25***  -2.98*  0.532  -0.408 
PPG 
debt/GDP 
EFF  -0.928* -1.93† -2.99***  2.56*** -0.824† 
IMF -0.0582  1.17***  0.389 0.150  ns 
SBA -0.0638  1.10***  -0.0266  1.23*** 1.09** 
PPG 
bonds/GDP 
EFF 0.0630  1.06*  -0.211  1.85*** 1.47*** 
IMF  -0.585*** -1.34***  -1.24 0.495  -0.677*** 
SBA  -0.521*** -1.69***  -2.13***  0.258  -0.597** 
PPG 
Bank.GDP 
EFF  -0.986***  0.376  -2.80***  0.789  -0.806*** 
IMF 0.0723 0.166 -0.642 0.196  0.209 
SBA 0.0566  0.0788 2.36* 0.0755 0.186 
PPG 
other/GDP 
EFF  -0.179  -0.337 -1.75 -0.111  -0.167 
 
nc: estimation did not converge for a reasonable range; ns: estimation was not significant. .  
The symbols ***, **, * and † indicate statistical significance at the 2%, 5%, 10% and 
20% levels for two-tailed tests. Bold coefficient estimates came from estimations with 
significant rho values (i.e. selectivity is important).  Probability levels in the last four 
columns refer to the estimated propensity to have an IMF agreement as derived from 
the probit equation in Table 3, and in our analysis is associated with the economic 
fundamentals of a country.    29
Table 3: Probit Equation for Estimating Propensities to Enter into IMF Agreements 
 
Variable  Estimated coefficient (normal 
statistic) 
GNP per capita 
GDP growth 
Reserves/Imports 
Change in reserves/imports 
Current Account Balance/GDP 
Change in current account 
Real exchange rate depreciation 
Debt service ratio 





Past IMF programs 
Fixed exchange rates 
Intermediate exchange rates 
Floating exchange rates 
Capital Account restrictions   
-0.000015  (-0.49) 
-0.0317 (-4.05) 
-0.677  (-2.63) 
-0.00076 (-1.61) 
0.253  (0.38) 
0.0000468  (1.44) 
-0.00023 (-0.63) 
0.397  (1.47) 
0.000403  (2.97) 
0.0374  (0.55) 
-0.726  (-2.85) 
0.164  (1.67) 
0.456  (3.51) 
0.878  (8.87) 
-0.914  (-5.50) 
-1.46  (-2.21) 
-0.746  (-3.92) 
-0.0351 (-0.25)   
Number of observations  1456 
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Data Appendix (mean and standard deviation in parentheses). 
All net flows: The sum of net portfolio, FDI, short-term debt, PPG debt and PNG debt 
flows, as a percentage of GDP. Source: World Bank Global Development 
Finance (3.99, 10.8) 
Portfolio: Purchases of shares and related assets by foreigners as a percentage of 
GDP. Source: World Bank Global Development Finance. (0.145, 0.863) 
FDI: Net foreign direct investment into a country as a percentage of GDP. Source: 
World Bank, Global Development Finance. (2.84, 3.95) 
Short-term debt: Net short-term debt flows as a percentage of GDP. Source: World 
Bank, Global Development Finance. (0.0312, 9.67) 
PPG debt: Net public and publicly guaranteed debt flows into a country as a 
percentage of GDP. Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance. 
(0.654, 2.06). Same source for sub-categories. 
PNG debt: Net private nonguaranteed debt flows into a country as a percentage of 
GDP. Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance. (0.324, 1.26). Same 
source for sub-categories. 
GNI per capita: GNI per capita in $U.S., Atlas method (World Bank, World 
Development Indicator) deflated by U.S. consumer price index (IMF: IMF 
Financial Statistics). (2607, 1724) 
Lagged growth: Percentage change in GDP, lagged one year. Source: World Bank, 
World Development Indicators. (3.58, 5.09) 
Lagged investment: Gross investment as a percentage of GDP, lagged one year. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. (24.8, 7.61) 
Exports/GDP: Ratio of exports to GDP. Source: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators.(0.378, 0.198) 
Real LIBOR: The London Interbank Offered Rate on U.S. 6 month Treasury Bills 
(annual average) less the rate of U.S. CPI inflation. Source: IMF, IMF 
Financial Statistics. (3.56, 1.92) 
Inflation: Percentage increase in the consumer price index. Source: World Bank, 
World Development Indicators.(64.4, 510) 
Lagged depreciation: The official number of domestic currency units per $U.S. 
multiplied by the ratio of the U.S. consumer price index to the country’s 
consumer price index.  This number is calculated for the current year and for 
three years previously (adjusting for changes in base years) and the difference 
between the two is expressed as a proportion of the value from three years 
before. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. (2.17, 16.7) 
Lagged reserve adequacy: Total foreign reserves divided by total imports of goods 
and services and debt service obligations (both in current $US), lagged by one 
year. Source: World Bank, Global Development Indicators. (0.327, 0.313) 
Debt Service:  Total long-term debt service payments divided by total exports of 
goods and services (all in U.S. dollars).  Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. (0.0898, 0.139) 
Debt/GDP: Total public and publicly guaranteed debt, divided by GDP (both in 
current $US), lagged by one year. Source: World Bank: World Development 
Indicators. (0.306, 0.347) 
Past Arrears: Total arrears on interest and principle as a percentage of public and 
publicly guaranteed debt. World Bank, summed for the previous four years. 
Global Development Finance.(19.1, 43.1) 
Past rescheduling: The number of years out of the previous four in which a country 
rescheduled some portion of its official or private interest or principal   31
repayments. Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance. (0.330, 
0.840) 
Past IMFmonths: Weighted number of months of the past three years in which a 
standby or EFF agreement is in effect (weights are 1, 0.75, and 0.5 for one, 
two and three years previously, respectively). Source: IMF, IMF Annual 
Report, various years. (6.19, 8.28) 
IMF Flows: Net borrowing from the IMF in the current year divided by imports and 
total debt service payments. Source: World Bank Global Development 
Finance.(-0.000111, 0.0124) 
IMF Failure: The number of agreements in the past four years which were 
“incomplete” according to the methodology of Killick et al, that is agreements 
with more than 20% of the commitment undrawn by the country at the time of 
expiry. Source: IMF Annual Report, various years. (0.296, 0.579) 
IMF treatment: The signing of either a standby agreement or EFF agreement with the 
IMF. Source: IMF Annual Report, various years. (0.226, 0.419) 
Lagged structural growth: The simple average of the GDP growth rate for the 
previous four years. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 
(3.73, 3.76) 
Lagged change in reserves: reserve adequacy from the previous year minus the 
reserve adequacy from two years previously, divided by the reserve adequacy 
two years previously. Source: World Bank Global Development Indicators. 
(1.79, 53.3) 
Lagged current account: The current account balance divided by GDP, lagged one 
year. Source: World Bank Global Development Indicators. (-0.0220, 0.0546) 
Lagged change in current account: The absolute difference between the current 
account balance and its value in the previous year as a percentage of the 
absolute current account balance in the previous year, all lagged one year. 
Source: World Bank Global Development Indicators. (-195.65, 2930) 
Imminent rescheduling: A binary indicator if a country required a Paris Club or 
London Club debt rescheduling in the next year, since IMF agreements are 
required for such a procedure. Source: World Bank Global Development 
Finance. (.179, .500) 
Past IMF agreements: A binary indicator of whether there was any IMF agreement in 
operation in any of the previous two years. Source: IMF Annual Report. 
(0.401, 0.490) 
Fixed exchange rate: An indicator if the country operated a fixed exchange rate 
system according to the Reinhart and Rogoff classification, lagged one year in 
the main estimations. Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). (0.243, 0.429) 
Intermediate exchange rate:  A binary indicators if the country had either of two 
intermediate exchange rate structures as defined in Reinhart and Rogoff.  
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). (0.437, 0.496) 
Flexible exchange rates: A binary indicators if the country had a flexible exchange 
rate as defined in Reinhart and Rogoff. Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
(0.158, 0.365) 
Capital Account Restriction: A binary indicator of the presence of capital controls in a 
country. Source: IMF Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
(0.787, 0.409)   32
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